Back to: Psychological Safety
BOEING
‘I am here to discuss the alarming state of Boeing’s 737 Renton, Washington factory in 2018. During this period, the factory produced hundreds of aircraft, including the two 737 MAX planes that crashed in October 2018 and March 2019. I witnessed a factory in chaos and reported serious concerns about production quality to senior Boeing leadership months before the first crash. I formally reported again before the second crash. No action was taken in response to either of my reports.’
This is an early comment in the recorded statement of Ed Pierson, subsequent to two fatal Boeing 737 MAX crashes. The first was a Lion Air (Indonesia) flight in October 2018, followed by an Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019, before both of which Pierson had raised concerns. 346 people died.
As with NASA, while there were technical issues, mostly to do with the safety system, cultural issues hampered learning, progress, and organisational performance.
A New York Times article, disturbingly titled I Honestly Don’t Trust Many People at Boeing’: A Broken Culture Exposed, goes on to say that ‘A trove of internal employee communications shows that the aviation giant’s troubles go beyond one poorly designed plane’. The trove is here.
Comments include:
- superiors penalized people in performance reviews and berated them on the factory floor
- to meet deadlines, managers sometimes played down or ignored problems
- employees said they had been punished or fired when they voiced concerns
- others resorted to litigation, saying they were retaliated against for flagging manufacturing mistakes
- superiors were warned in “very directly and threatening ways” that pay was at risk if the targets weren’t met
- it was a climate that didn’t reward people willing to challenge managers
- “this is a bad excuse, but it’s what I’m being pressured into complying with”
- senior employees consistently undermined, deceived and obfuscated regulators.
Before the second crash, Pierson had said:
- manufacturing managers were peppered with schedule-related questions and publicly criticized during daily status meetings . . . in front of 100+ colleagues.
- executives routinely disregarded, bypassed, and/or ignored the technical advice of experienced senior managers.
- There were concerns that less experienced managers might model this type of leadership and communication style
Pierson’s formal statement after the second crash condemns Boeing’s production over safety and quality attitude. He notes the breakdown in communications that developed, confusion between shifts about what tasks had or had not been completed, aversion to exploring systemic causes for crashes, worker fatigue, cultural problems, and the ease with which his concerns were repeatedly dismissed or ignored.
(Read Pierson’s full statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Read the full House Hearing, 116th Congress – The Boeing 737 MAX: Examining the Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight of the aircraft’s certification.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY TAKEAWAYS
Perhaps more than anything else, employees identified fear around speaking up. It wasn’t as if people didn’t speak up. Many did, fearful of the potential outcomes of saying nothing. But this brought only reprisals, ethical compromises, or silence. Jobs, reputations, promotions and even company-related pensions, were at risk. Communication was poor between divisions, information was not shared, and managers were increasingly removed, including physically, from the work the company was doing.
Further reading
Read some of our blog posts: